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SUMMARY 
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and 
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A new fault-tolerant system software concept emploYIng the pr1mary d1g1tal computers as host for the 
backup software port10n has been 1mplemented and f11ght tested 1n the F-B d1g1tal fly-by-w1re a1rplane. 
The system was 1mplemented 1n such a way that essent1ally no transIents occurred 1n transferr1ng from 
pr1mary to backup software. Th1s was accomp11shed w1thout a s1gn1f1cant 1ncrease 1n the complex1ty of 
the backup software. The pr1mary d1g1tal system was frame synchron1zed, wh1ch prov1ded several advan-
tages In 1mplement1ng the res1dent backup software system. S1nce the t1me of the f11ght tests, two other 
f11ght veh1cle programs have made a comm1tment to 1ncorporate res1dent backup software s1m11ar 1n nature 
to the system descr1bed 1n th1s paper. 
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D1 g1 ta 1 fl1 ght contro 1 system des 1 gners have been concerned W1 th protect 1 ng aga1 nst "generl c" soft-
ware errors for as long as d1g1tal f11ght control has been 1n eX1stence. The standard approach has been 
to prov1de a d1ss1m11ar hardware backup control system, usually analog 1n 1mplementat10n. Although a 
d1ss1m11ar hardware backup prov1des a way of ma1nta1n1ng control of the a1rcraft 1n the event of gener1c 
software errors, 1t 1S a costly solut10n that fa11s to take advantage of the unfa11ed pr1mary system 
hardware assets. It also requ1res a redundant sW1tch1ng mechan1sm to accept system commands from the 
act1ve system and pass these commands to the redundant actuators. In the case of analog backups, the 
d1sadvantages can be even greater because of the need for sensor 1nputs that are compat1ble with both 
d1g1tal and analog systems. Th1s usually means a separate set of sensors are needed for each system. 
Several approaches have been advocated for handlIng software errors wIthout requIrIng 1ndependent 
backup hardware. One approach IS to ut111ze d1ss1m11ar software In each of the redundant hardware chan-
nels. Th1S approach has been used w1th success on the A310 a1rbus (Ref. 1). Although successful for 
that app11cat10n, th1s approach results In a system wIth WIder tolerances on the trackIng between chan-
nels that may have d1sadvantages 1n other applIcatIons. A second approach IS to 1mplement 1dent1cal 
d1ss1m11ar software sets w1th1n each of the redundant hardware channels. Th1s has been referred to by 
various names, the most common be1ng "recovery blocks." The resIdent backup software (REBUS) descr1bed 
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ln thlS paper lS of thlS second type. It has the advantage of mlnlmlzlng hardware and retalns the advan-
tages of relatlvely tlght tracklng between the unfalled hardware channels. 
Conslderable debate has gone on concernlng the amount of dlsslmllarlty necessary to assure coverage 
for the generlc software error. In thls debate, a dlstlnctlon lS made between several classes of soft-
ware errors and the amount of dlsslmllarlty necessary for protectlon for each of these error classes. 
One class of generlc error lS the deslgn error, In WhlCh the speclfled deslgn lS not adequate to 
handle the envlronment encountered In the actual appllcatlon. As an example, the coupllng between a 
structural mode and the aerodynamlcs lS sufflclently dlfferent from that slmulated In ground tests that 
the resultlng closed loop through the control system becomes unstable. 
The second class of generlc software error lS the lmplementatlon error, WhlCh results In a system 
that does not meet the speclfled deslgn. A partlcular dlfflculty concerns the latent system or software 
defect that goes undetected In testlng but lS exposed under certaln envlronmental condltlonS experlenced 
ln fllght. These lmplementatlon errors can occur at a number of dlfferent levels· ln the algorlthm 
chosen by the des1gner, 1n the way the software coder wr1tes the source code, or ln the complIer, whIch 
converts the source code to machIne language. In every case, these errors would go undetected through-
out ground testIng and manIfest themselves In an unsafe manner In actual flIght. ImplementatIon errors 
In the complIer are usually consIdered to be least llkely, a complIer receIves a conslderable amount of 
ImplICIt testIng as a result of all the code that lS generated and exposed to a WIde range of condItIons 
durIng the extensIve verlflcatlon and valldatl0n that are characterIstIc of man-rated dlgltal fly-by-
WIre systems. 
Even when care IS taken to assure dlsslmllarlty for each level of ImplementatIon error, precautlons 
must be taken to assure a successful transfer to the dISSImIlar software because of the nature oflthe 
dlgltal computer and the unforeseeable consequences of a software error. ThIS IS most Important durIng 
InItIalIzatIon of the dlss1ml1ar software because vehIcle state data are needed to establIsh proper 
startup condItIons. The danger eXlsts that the software error In the prImary system has caused con-
tamInatIon of the vehIcle state data, thereby ralSlng the pOSSIbIlIty of InItIalIZIng the backup software 
at an unsafe condItIon. I 
I 
Potentlal problems of thls type have been of concern and have been some of the prlnclpal reasons 
that deSIgners have chosen to use the better understood, albelt more expenSIve, analog backup. The 
fllght experlment descrIbed In thls paper was done to reduce the rIsk assocIated WIth backup software, 
wlth the hope that thls more cost-effectlve method WIll be SUItable for use In future flIght control 
system deslgns. The experlment utlllzed the F-8 dlgltal fly-by-wlre (DFBW) alrplane operated by the NASA 
Ames Research Center's Dryden FlIght Research Faclllty (ADFRF) at Edwards, Callfornla. The system lmple-
mentatlon was accomplIshed by the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (CSOL). 
FLIGHT EXPERIMENT OBJECTIVES 
The F-8 OFBW aIrplane lS operated as a fllght faclllty for evaluatIng new concepts, such as REBUS, In 
the real fllght envIronment. One key step In preparlng for a fllght test IS the Independent reVlew by 
people wlth broad operatlonal experlence In flIght test. At ADFRF, thIS reVIew process IS called the 
fllght readlness revIew (FRR). The value of evaluatlng a system or concept In flIght lS that the 'system 
wlll, by necesslty, be subJected to close scrutlny and thorough testIng to recelve a favorable response 
from the FRR commlttee. It wlll also be subjected to the actual fllght envlronment, whIch WIll be dlf-
ferent to some degree from that experlenced In ground test. Those dIfferences, and theIr effect ~n the 
system behavlor, are lmportant In understandlng the concept under evaluatIon. I 
These conslderatlons contrIbuted to the establIshment of the experlment obJectlve· to thoroughly 
evaluate a hIgh-potentIal approach to fault-tolerant software utl1lzlng a dlsslmllar software flIght 
control system concept, subjectIng It to all the processes necessary to qualIfy It for flIght and valI-
datIng those processes through subsequent flIght test. 
The REBUS concept was selected for evaluatIon because of ltS system-wIde effICIency gaIned by 
utl1lzlng the same computIng hardware used by the prImary system. 
F-8 DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE SYSTEM 
The F-8 OFBW alrplane (FIg. 1) was modIfIed by InstallIng a fall-operate, fall-safe dlgltal fly-by-
Wlre system. (A detaIled descrIptIon of the system IS presented In Ref. 2.) It lS useful to provide 
some detalls In a slmpllfled form to make explanatIons of the REBUS modIfIcatIons easIer. The DFBW 
system contalns a trIplex dlg1tal prlmary system wlth a trlplex analog computer bypass system servIng as 
Its backup. Flgure 2 Illustrates the lnterface between the two systems. The trlplex prImary system utl-
llzes redundant dlgltal computers, and CSOL provlded Interface unIts (IFUs). Redundant aIrcraft motlon 
sensors and pIlot stlck transducers are conneced to the IFUs. Surface commands are passed through I an 
analog mldvalue voter, WIth the mldvalue of the three channels passed on to the servo drIve electronIcs. 
Thls mldvalue voter, beIng external to the dIgItal computer, has addltlonal analog clrcultry that can 
declare anyone of the dlgltal output commands as falled and dlsable the partIcular channel output at the 
mldvalue Input plane. 
Analog BacKup System 
The analog bacKup IS a dIrect electrIcal lInk between the pIlot's stIck and the servo drIve elec-
tronIcs. The redundant commands are passed through the same mldvalue select devIces utIlIzed by the 
prImary system. ThIS system, forward of the mldvalue voter, IS called the computer bypass system. 
Prlnary System 
The prImary system IS frame synchronIzed. ThIs synchronIsm facIlItates the exchange of data between 
computers and the Input/output (I/O) functIon that dIstrIbutes sensor lnfornatlon between computers, such 
that each receIves a copy of all avaIlable sensor Inputs. 
The prImary software mechanIzes a nunber of dIfferent control laws for the aIrcraft. They are the 
dIrect mode (control stIck to surface actuator wIthout any feedback) and stabIlIty augmentatIon system 
mode for the pItch, roll, and yaw axes. The pItch aXIs also contaIns the command augmentatIon system 
for further Improvement In handlIng qualItIes. FInally, there are the standard autopIlot modes of 
aIrcraft control. 
The Input sensor set Includes not only pIlot stIck and pedal sensors and vehIcle motIon sensors, but 
also InformatIon on surface commands and posItIons. In partIcular, the left and rIght elevator posItIons 
and the last surface command to all fIve control surfaces are avaIlable In the Input sensor buffer 
located external to the dIgItal conputers In the IFU. ThIS control surface InformatIon IS useful In the 
InItIalIzatIon of the REBUS software. 
The prImary software contaIns a capabIlIty of recoverIng from transIent errors. ThIs capabIlIty 
(known as "restart") InItIalIzes the control laws after a potentIally resettable faIlure has been IndI-
cated, and It attempts to recompute, antIcIpatIng that the faIlure WIll not reoccur. The software has 
been set up to recycle through the restart 10 tImes. If the faIlure stIll persIsts after 10 cycles, the 
channel declares a channel faIlure and IS voted out by the remaInIng good channels. If one channel has 
already faIled, the flIght control system would be forced Into the computer bypass system. 
Of the varIous condItIons that can create a faIlure condItIon, two cause Imnedlate faIlure declara-
tIons, and one (desIgnated "executIon error") IS potentIally resettable. These condItIons are the 
followIng 
1. FaIlure to perform an I/O functIon wIthIn 53 msec of the last I/O (the control law frame tIme IS 
20 msec) 
2. FaIlure to update the watchdog tImer 
3. ExecutIon error for 10 consecutIve progran IteratIons or once every 6 IteratIons for 306 
IteratIons 
The reason for attemptIng 10 restarts before declarIng a channel faIlure IS the tIme duratIon that 
can be tolerated wIthout a surface command update" For the F-8 aIrcraft wIth stable bare aIrframe, a 
300-msec tIme perIod can be tolerated, 10 restarts requIre between 100 and 300 msec, dependIng on 
where the faIlure IndIcatIon occurs wIthIn the compute cycle. 
REBUS SYSTEM DESIGN 
Several tradeoffs must be made before specIfYIng a ~ystem desIgn. Many are sImIlar to those made 
tradItIonally for an Independent hardware backup. Issues such as complexIty of the backup, crIterIa for 
automatIc transfer, and Interchannel synchronIzatIon must be addressed. Other Issues that are speCIfIc 
to thIs experIment, In that an eXIstIng system was modIfIed, WIll not be dIscussed. 
ComplexIty 
SelectIon of control laws IS usually based on the mlnlnum necessary to prOVIde return to the base and 
safe landIng capabIlIty. In the case of the F-8 DFBW aIrcraft, an unaugmented backup would be adequate 
to prOVIde the necessary functIonalIty. For thIs experIment, the decIsIon was made to Include slIghtly 
more capabIlIty than the bare mInImum to better represent modern aIrplanes, whIch generally requIre 
augmentatIon to some degree. Three-axIs fIxed-gaIn rate dampIng was selected. FIgure 3 Illustrates, In 
the form of a block dIagram, the pItch-aXIS stabIlIty augmentatIon system. As can be seen, there are 
several nonlInear functIons, such as stIck shapIng and dead band. The only devIatIon from fIxed gaIn IS 
the selectIon of a landIng approach gaIn set when the wIng IS put In the up posItIon and the control sur-
face authorItIes are modIfIed. (The standard F-8 aIrcraft prOVIdes for two wIng-IncIdence POSItIons, the 
wIng-up posItIon prOVIdIng Improved pIlot vlsablllty durIng the landIng approach.) The other axes are 
SImIlar In compleXIty. 
The control law conputatlon cycle could be mechanIzed qUIte SImply by uSIng a straIght In-lIne code 
and very few branches. Many of the self-check functIons, such as sensor redundancy management, could 
also be elImInated to reduce compleXIty. The overall compleXIty was reduced conSIderably relatIve to the 
prImary system. For example, the REBUS software reqUIred less than one-tenth the memory that the prImary 
software reqUIred. The compute cycle was selected to be 50 samples per second, the same as that of the 
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prImary system (for convenIence, In that It reduced the amount of separate stabIlIty analysIs and valIda-
tIon necessary). 
Transfer CrIterIon 
A crIterIon was needed for automatIc transfer to backup, assumIng that a generIc software error could 
cause a sItuatIon requIrIng actIon sooner than the pIlot can react. The approprIate solutIon was to use 
the channel faIlure declaratIon, whIch IS based on repeated self-executIon error IndIcatIon. FaIlures to 
execute whIle In the control law code are representatIve of the faIlure mode for whIch the backup soft-
ware was Intended, In that the system behaves In the way that a generIc software faIlure would be 
expected to manIfest Itself. 
It IS deSIrable to mInImIze transIents that occur upon transfer to backup If thIS does not contrIbute 
to Increased complexIty or other undeSIrable effects. GIven that the system faIlure has occurred because 
of a generIc software error, one must also assume that there IS a fInIte probabIlIty that the record of 
the aIrcraft state as maIntaIned In the memory of the system computers has been degraded by the faIlure. 
Therefore, one must look elsewhere for the InformatIon reqUIred to InItIalIze the backup software. 
The only InformatIon that the backup software needs to take control of the aIrcraft wIthout Intro-
dUCIng an obJectIonable transIent In aIrcraft state IS the current posItIon of the aIrcraft control sur-
faces. ThIS allows for some small transIents that result from relnltlallzatlon of any actIve fIlters and 
changes In loop gaIns from state-dependent to fIxed values. 
Three assumptIons were made relatIve to InItIalIzatIon of the REBUS software. 
I 
1. PrImary software faIlure occurs sImultaneously In at least two channels of the system. 
2. The trIgger mechanIsm generates sImultaneous pulses for at least two channels of the system. 
3. At least two channels sImultaneously execute the Input sensor I/O functIon. I 
GIven these assumptIons, the backup software can be InItIalIzed to the aIrcraft's eXIstIng control 
surface commands, and thus It generates no transIent other than that due to gaIn changes. ThIS IS 
pOSSIble because the sImultaneous performance of the InItIal Input sensor I/O functIon by the computers 
enables them to receIve a full complement of sensor SIgnals, that IS, not only theIr own dedIcated set 
but those dedIcated to other computers. 
Return to PrImary 
A maJor Issue for any backup system deSIgner IS whether return to prImary should be allowed. If the 
prImary system has suffered a maJor fault, then It must be assumed that transferrIng back to that defec-
tIve system IS unsafe. On the other hand, If the backup software IS not prOVIdIng a controllable 
aIrplane, the pIlot may want to try the prImary software In a last-dItch effort. Thus, both SIdes of the 
Issue could be argued wIthout reachIng a clear resolutIon. For an experImental system such as the F-8 
REBUS, It IS deSIrable to transfer Into backup even though no serIous problem eXIsts wIth the prImary. 
For test purposes, It IS hIghly deSIrable to be able to transfer back and forth at WIll durIng a gIven 
flIght. For these reasons, provIsIons were Included In REBUS and the F-8 DFBW prImary system for 
transfer back to prImary from REBUS. 
Interchannel SynchronIzatIon 
SInce the prImary synchronIzatIon algorIthm IS a software functIon, the REBUS must prOVIde a dISSImI-
lar synchronIzatIon algorIthm If a synchronIzed backup system IS to be establIshed. The dangers asso-
CIated wlthnot beIng able to synchronIze upon transfer to REBUS must be conSIdered. Also, the addItIonal 
complexIty assocIated wIth synchronIzatIon makes It less deSIrable from a system complexIty standp'olnt. 
For these reasons, It was decIded to establIsh REBUS as an asynchronous system. ThIS dec1s10n has' 
several ram1f1catl0ns (such as, no exchange of data between computers can be performed because of the 
complex1ty of add1ng an asynchronous data transfer capabl11ty). I 
Sensor cross-trapp1ng 1S used 1n the pr1mary system to ensure that each channel operates on Ident1cal 
data. W1th the asynchronous approach 1n the REBUS, each computer must operate on ded1cated sensors that 
are 1ndependent of the operat10n of the other computers. Because of th1s 1nterchannel 1ndependence, It 
1S of Interest 1n both ground and fl1ght tests to see how much varlat10n develops between each channel. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The spec1flc detaIls of the REBUS Implementat10n were strongly dependent on the pecul1arlt1es of the 
F-8 DFBW system. Some funct10ns were Included 1n the total mod1f1ed DFBW system because 1t was a fl1ght 
experIment and It was requ1red that tests be performed easIly. These detaIls Include the tr1ggerlng 
mechan1sm, the approach to sImulatIng software errors, and the status of the computer bypass system. 
REBUS Trlggerlng 
The fallure detectlon 10glC In the prlmary system causes the generatlon of a dlscrete output from 
the computer channel that lS lndlcatlng a fallure. ThlS dlscrete output lS processed by external Clr-
cUltry unlque to each channel computer. ThlS clrcultry sets a channel fallure lndlcator, WhlCh lS 
then passed to the other channels. ThlS dlscrete was convenlent for use as the trlgger generator, 
therefore, a ClrCUlt that voted the dlscrete output from each computer was constructed for each chan-
nel. If two of three computers would generate a dlscrete. the trlgger pulse would be produced for that 
channel. Flgure 4 lllustrates the relatlve locatlon of tne added hardware lncludlng a sWltchlng card 
In the IFU and a transfer Clrcult external to the computer. Also shown lS the REBUS memory In the prl-
mary dlgltal computer. 
ThlS trlgger pulse must be lntroduced lnto the computer to lnltlate the executlon of the backup soft-
ware. The pulse could not enter as some external lnterrupt, for the computer could fall In such a way 
that all lnterrupts would be masked. The only "lnterrupt" that would be recognlzed by the computer at 
any tlme and under any condltlons was the system reset. 
Each channel has ltS own trlgger clrcult. ThlS mechanlzatlon provldes protectlon agalnst lnadvertent 
sWltchlng of the system from prlmary software to backup software. Two of three computers must be 
generatlng a channel fall to produce the trlgger pulse. If a partlcular trlgger clrcult falls and 
generates a pulse when none lS commanded, only that channel's computer sWltches to backup, and any 
dlscrepancy between ltS outputs and the other computers' outputs wlll be voted out by the external mld-
value voters. Fallure to generate a pulse when one lS commanded wlll not prevent the other two computers 
from sWltchlng to backup software. 
Software Programmlng 
Ideally, lt would have been deslrable to have people other than those lnvolved In prlmary software 
development mechanlze the backup software. Also, lt would have been advlsable to use software develop-
ment tools dlfferent than those used for the prlmary software. Nelther one of these steps for enhanced 
dlsslmllarlty were used for thlS experlment because of the added tlme and cost assoclated wlth them. 
There would have been no way to evaluate the effects of these addltlonal steps wlthln the llmlted scope 
of thlS experlment, so lt was not deemed necessary to lnclude thlS addltlonal expense. 
Slmulatlon of Errors 
For the purposes of thlS experlment, a slmulated generlc software error was needed. Several types of 
generlc software fallures were studled as to how they would manlfest themselves as apparent hardware 
fallures. It was apparent that a generlc software fallure that would be of sufflclent severlty to brlng 
the prlmary system down would be such that a restart would result. ThlS can be slmulated by addlng an 
lnstructlon to wrlte to a protected portlon of memory. Segments of memory can be protected from belng 
wrltten to. Thus, the slmulatlon of a generlc software error was lmplemented by lncludlng a pllot-
selectable branch In software that lncluded a wrlte lnstructlon lnto a protected portlon of memory. 
Several dlfferent pOlnts wlthln the control law code were selected for error lnsertlon. The error 
lnsertlon functlon was subject to an armlng devlce, also pllot selectable. 
Computer Bypass 
Slnce the unmodlfled F-8 DFBW already had a backup provlded by the computer bypass system, the 
questlon arose as to whether the computer bypass functlon should be removed when the REBUS was added. 
Retalnlng the computer bypass would be In effect a backup on a backup. However, a strong argument 
eXlsted for not removlng lt because of the rellablllty record of the speclflc prototype prlmary computers 
avallable to the F-8 program. Wlth the computer bypass system, the total system hardware rellablllty lS 
adequate for safe operatlon. Thus, the computer bypass system was retalned for lts contrlbutlon to hard-
ware rellablllty. 
GROUND TESTS 
An lmportant step ln evaluatlng the REBUS system was the F-8 Ironblrd slmulator, WhlCh utlllzes a 
decommlSSloned F-8 alrcraft wlth a complete DFBW system lnstalled. The aerodynamlcs are slmulated In a 
general-purpose slmulatlon computer. The speclallzed hardware necessary for the REBUS was lmplemented In 
brassboard verSlons of the lnterface unlts. 
Part of the ground tests was the determlnatlon of transfer translents for a number of fallure lnser-
tlon pOlnts wlthln the control law code. The only slgnlflcant dlfference was whether the fallure was 
lnserted before or after the actuator command output. Flgure 5 lllustrates the sltuatlon for a typlcal 
20-msec control compute cycle. The end of ClI (control law software module) represents the pOlnt at 
WhlCh the actuator output command occurs. The flrst fallure lnsertlon pOlnt lS represented by FAIlI (at 
the end of RMI, the flrst part of the sensor redundancy management software module). Other software 
modules lnclude SYNCH XlINK, WhlCh performs the synchronlzatlon cross-llnk, RM2, WhlCh lS the second part 
of redundancy management, and DOWNLINK and CIP, WhlCh process the data recordlng and the pllot's computer 
lnput panel, respectlvely. Another fallure lnsertlon pOlnt was FAIl2, representatlve of a fallure 
occurrlng after the surface output commands. As In the ground tests, lf the fallure occurred prlor to 
the surface command update, such as at FAIlI, the alrcraft sustalned a longer perlod of tlme wlthout 
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surface comnands, and the backup software was InltlallZed wIth relatIVely old aIrcraft state InformatIOn. 
DependIng on the aIrcraft motIon at the tIme of the faIlure, the transIent on transfer varIed. In no 
case was the transIent consIdered severe. 
I The tIme perIod wIth no control, between 240 and 3UU nsec, IS a functIon of the amount of tIme the 
prImary systen IS allowed to attempt to correct Itself. FIgure 6 shows (In a sImplIfIed form) how a 
fault occurrIng at the end of DOWNLINK and CIP would be repeated through lU attempts to restart whIle 
stIll In the prImary system. For thIs case, the transfer tIme was 294 msec. For the F-8 aIrcraft, thIs 
tllne perIod I~ short enough that It does not cause any control problem. For other aIrplanes, the 
allowable tIme perIod may be much shorter, In whIch case a smaller value for the faIlure counter:should 
be selected, assurIng controllabIlIty, however, thIs wIll dImInIsh the system's tolerance of transIent 
faIlures that can be withstood wIthout transfer to the backup. I 
FLIGHT TESTS 
At the ADFRF flIght readIness revIew (FRR), most of the detaIls of the desIgn and the results from 
the ground tests were revIewed wIthout SIgnIfIcant comment. There was one major concern raIsed that may 
have ImplIcatIons for others. ThIS concerned the plans for enablIng the REBUS after safely at altItude. 
The FRR commIttee questIoned the adVIsabIlIty of takIng off the fIrst tIne wIth the REBUS enabled. The 
comnlttee felt that the system should not be enabled untIl a safe altItude was achIeved. The commIttee 
also raIsed a questIon as to the expected transIent If the systen was forced to REBUS at llftoffJ gIven 
that the REBUS was enabled. It was fInally determIned that the more conservatIve approach was to walt 
untIl a safe altItude was achIeved before enablIng the system. I 
Once the FRR commIttee approved the plans, the flIght experIment began. The fIrst flIght was on 
23 July 1984. A summary of the flIghts IS presented In Table 1. The emphasIs of the experIment 'was on 
comparIng flIght wIth slnulatlon. ThIS Included the trackIng between channels, transfer tranSIents, 
susceptIbIlIty to unwanted transfers, and general operatIonal factors. I 
The trackIng between channels was very close. At no tIme durIng the flIght tests dId drIfts occur 
between the three channels. ThIS was In agreement wIth the sImulatIon runs conducted prIor to flIght 
I • 
The transfer transIents were neglIgIble, even when occurrIng durIng elevated-g maneuvers. In most 
cases, the transfer to REBUS could not be detected In the control surface traces. FIgure 7 shows' a typI-
cal tIme response In the pItch aXIS, whIch Illustrates the excellent performance for a transfer durIng a 
3.5-g turn. I 
There were no unwanted transfers encountered durIng the flIght tests. ThIS was to be expected 
because the transfer mechanIsm was the same as had been used to cause a transfer to computer bypass In all 
the prevIous flIght tests wIth the F-8 DFBW aIrplane. There had never been a transfer to computer bypass 
over an eIght-year perIod of flIght testIng. I 
From an operatIonal standpoInt, no SIgnIfIcant concerns arose. EvaluatIon of the handlIng qualItIes 
for the REBUS control laws was Included under operatIonal assessment. Two pIlots evaluated the system, 
evaluatIng It as acceptable for emergency operatIons and preferable to the computer bypass mode. 
EXTENSION OF CONCEPT TO OTHER APPLICATIONS 
The experIence gaIned wIth the F-8 REBUS flIght experIment has raIsed some Issues relatIve to future 
applIcatIons. Many of the reconmendatlons that could be made apply to dISSImIlar backup systems n 
general. We WIll restrIct the comments here to Issues applIcable only to resIdent software backups. 
I Much of the REBUS deSIgn was dependent on the synchronous nature of the prImary system. If the prl-
nary system were asynchronous, It would be valuable for InItIalIZIng the REBUS to have all surface POSI-
tIons avaIlable In the Input data set. I 
Concepts sImIlar to REBUS have already been Incorporated Into the deSIgns for other flIght applIca-
tIons. The X-wIng rotorcraft program (Ref. 3) utIlIzes a Jam-transfer software backup that IS nearly the 
same as REBUS. The F-16C and D aIrcraft wIth dIgItal fly-by-wlre systems WIll have resIdent software 
backups In the prImary system memorIes. 
CONCLUS IONS 
The F-8 resIdent backup software (REBUS) flIght experIment has denonstrated a cost-effectIve approach 
to prOVIdIng dISSImIlar redundancy to protect agaInst generIc software faIlures. The major flndllgs are 
as follows 
1. ResIdent backup software that prOVIdes protectIon for prImary software errors Cdn be Implemented. 
2. TranSIents that occur durIng transfer from prImary to backup can be mInImIzed wIth lIttle Impact 
on system complexIty. 
3. Independent reviewers with broad operational background in flight test can be satisfied that 
resident software backups offer adequate assurance of flight safety. 
Recent incorporation of backup software approaches similar to REBUS into the designs of upcoming 
flight vehicles, coupled with the successful results from this flight experiment, offers evidence 
that this concept will find industry-wide acceptance as a viable solution to the generic software 
error problem. 
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Table 1. REBUS FLIGHT SUMMARY 
Number of flights in REBUS 
Total flight time for these 6 flights 
Total flight time in REBUS 
Number of transfers to REBUS 
Number of transfers to primary 
Number of transfers at >1 g ••• 
Highest g level at REBUS transfer 
Number of low approaches in REBUS 
Number of touch and gas in REBUS 
Number of landings in REBUS ••• 
6 
6 h 50 min 
3 h 54 min 
• • 22 
• • 18 
6 
3.5 g 
6 
10 
5 
EeN 3312 
Figure 1. F-8 digitaL fLy-by-wire airpLane. 
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